How Do Acquirers Retain Successful Target CEOs? The Role of Governance

被引:39
作者
Wulf, Julie [1 ]
Singh, Harbir [2 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Harvard Business Sch, Boston, MA 02163 USA
[2] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
organizational studies; strategy; motivation-incentives; finance; corporate finance; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; GOLDEN PARACHUTES; MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; EQUITY PRICES; FIRM; MANAGERIAL; OWNERSHIP; MERGERS; PERFORMANCE; RENTS;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1110.1414
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
The resource-based view argues that acquisitions can build competitive advantage partially through retention of valuable human capital of the target firm. However, making commitments to retain and motivate successful top managers is a challenge when contracts are not enforceable. Investigating the conditions under which target chief executive officers (CEOs) are retained in a sample of mergers in the 1990s, we find greater retention of better-performing and higher-paid CEOs-both measures of valuable human capital. We also show that the performance-retention link is stronger when the acquirer's governance provisions support managers and when the acquirer's CEO owns more equity. Although it is not common for acquirers to retain target CEOs, we argue that they are more likely to do so when their governance environment maintains managerial discretion. Based on a joint analysis of retention and governance, our findings are largely consistent with a managerial human capital explanation of retention.
引用
收藏
页码:2101 / 2114
页数:14
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