New evidence on the market for directors: Board membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310

被引:103
作者
Coles, JL [1 ]
Hoi, CK
机构
[1] Arizona State Univ, Tempe, AZ 85281 USA
[2] Rochester Inst Technol, Rochester, NY 14623 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1540-6261.00522
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the relation between a boards decision to reject antitakeover provisions of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 and subsequent labor market opportunities of those same board members. Compared to directors retaining all provisions, directors rejecting all protective provisions of SB1310 are three times as likely to gain additional external directorships and are 30 percent more likely to retain their internal slot on the board of that same Pennsylvania company. For external board seats, the results are driven by nonexecutive directors who are not members of the management team; for internal board seats, the results are driven by executive directors.
引用
收藏
页码:197 / 230
页数:34
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