The evolution of degrees of cooperation

被引：47

作者：

Frean, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV OTAGO, DEPT ZOOL, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LAB, DUNEDIN, NEW ZEALAND

来源：

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY | 1996年 / 182卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jtbi.1996.0194

中图分类号：

Q [生物科学];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

The Prisoner's Dilemma has been widely studied as a model for the evolution of cooperation, and most of this work has dealt with agents who either cooperate or not. In this paper we look at the consequences of allowing agents to have intermediate levels of cooperation, and to update these levels over time. The familiar strategy of ''tit for tat'' emerges as a robust mode of behaviour, yet there are important differences between this case and that of ''all or nothing'' cooperation. (C) 1996 Academic Press Limited

引用

页码：549 / 559

页数：11

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