On money pumps

被引:42
作者
Cubitt, RP [1 ]
Sugden, R [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ E Anglia, Sch Econ & Social Studies, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
money pump; Dutch book; sequential decisions; consequentialism; expected utility theory; economic selection;
D O I
10.1006/game.2000.0834
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The question of whether money pump arguments justify standard consistency assumptions about behavior has remained unresolved, partly because of the absence of an appropriate analytical framework. We present a new framework which fills this gap, provide a formal definition of invulnerability to money pumps, and formulate a requirement of maximal opportunism. We show that behavior which satisfies none of the standard consistency assumptions can be both invulnerable and maximally opportunist. We present two conditions which, combined with maximal opportunism, imply the existence of a choice function rationalized by an ordering and satisfying the sure thing principle. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:121 / 160
页数:40
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