Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information

被引：13

作者：

Banerjee, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Ohio State Univ, Dept Agr Environm & Dev Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2005年 / 88卷 / 01期

关键词：

common value auctions; asymmetric bidders;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.025

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study a first price auction with two asymmetric bidders. A unique generically asymmetric equilibrium exists under some conditions. Aggressive bidding is not necessarily associated with inferiority of information. Reduction in asymmetry can have an ambiguous effect on revenue. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：47 / 53

页数：7

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