Performance standards in incentive contracts

被引:247
作者
Murphy, KJ [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ So Calif, Marshall Sch Business, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
关键词
management compensation; performance standards; bonus contracts; incentives; earnings management;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00013-1
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Research in incentives has focused on performance measures and pay-performance sensitivities but has largely ignored the "performance standard", which generates important incentives whenever plan participants can influence the standard-setting process. "Internally determined" standards are directly affected by management actions in the current or prior year, while "externally determined" standards are less easily affected. I show that companies choose external standards when prior performance is a noisy estimate of contemporaneous performance. In addition, companies using budget based and other internally determined performance standards have less-variable bonus payouts, and are more likely to smooth earnings, than companies using externally determined standards. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:245 / 278
页数:34
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