Position Auctions with Consumer Search

被引：169

作者：

Athey, Susan ^{[1
]}

Ellison, Glenn

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 126卷 / 03期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D44; L86; M37; INFORMATION; INTERNET; KEYWORDS; DESIGN;

D O I：

10.1093/qje/qjr028

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about firm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.

引用

页码：1213 / 1270

页数：58

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