Rigor or rigor mortis? Rational choice and security studies

被引:119
作者
Walt, SM [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Social Sci Collegiate Div, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1162/isec.23.4.5
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码:5 / 48
页数:44
相关论文
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