Targeted killings have become a central component of counter-terrorism strategy. In response to the unprecedented prevalence of this strategy around the world, numerous empirical studies have recently examined whether "decapitating" militant groups with targeted killings is strategically effective. This study builds on that research program by examining the impact of targeted killings on militant group tactical decision-making. Our empirical strategy exploits variation in the attack patterns of militant groups conditional on whether a government's targeted killing attempt succeeded against them operationally. In both the Afghanistan-Pakistan and Israel-West Bank-Gaza Strip theaters, targeted killings significantly alter the nature of militant group violence. When their leaderships are degraded with a successful strike, militant groups become far less discriminate in their target selection by redirecting their violence from military to civilian targets. We then analyze several potential causal mechanisms to account for these results and find strongest evidence that targeted killings tend to promote indiscriminate organizational violence by empowering lower level members with weaker civilian restraint.
机构:
John F Kennedy Sch Govt, Belfer Ctr Sci & Int Affairs, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAJohn F Kennedy Sch Govt, Belfer Ctr Sci & Int Affairs, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
机构:
Harvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, Belfer Ctr Sci & Int Affairs, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAHarvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, Belfer Ctr Sci & Int Affairs, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
机构:
John F Kennedy Sch Govt, Belfer Ctr Sci & Int Affairs, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAJohn F Kennedy Sch Govt, Belfer Ctr Sci & Int Affairs, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
机构:
Harvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, Belfer Ctr Sci & Int Affairs, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAHarvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, Belfer Ctr Sci & Int Affairs, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA