Morale hazard

被引：55

作者：

Fang, HM ^{[1
]}

Moscarini, G ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS | 2005年 / 52卷 / 04期

关键词：

overconfidence; worker morale; wage-setting policies;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.02.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We interpret workers' confidence in their own skills as their morale, and investigate the implication of worker overconfidence on the firm's optimal wage-setting policies. In our model, wage contracts both provide incentives and affect worker morale, by revealing private information of the firm about worker skills. We provide conditions for the non-differentiation wage policy to be profit-maximizing. In numerical examples, worker overconfidence is a necessary condition for the firm to prefer no wage differentiation, so as to preserve some workers' morale; the non-differentiation wage policy itself breeds more worker overconfidence; finally, wage compression is more likely when aggregate productivity is low. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：749 / 777

页数：29