The evolution of conventions with mobile players

被引：21

作者：

Dieckmann, T ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Univ Ireland, Dept Econ, Maynooth, Kildare, Ireland

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1999年 / 38卷 / 01期

关键词：

evolution of conventions; mobility; imperfect observability;

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00125-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper analyzes the evolution of conventions in a society with local interaction and mobile players. Three innovative aspects are introduced: Imperfect observability of play outside a player's home location, friction in the strategy adjustment process, and restricted mobility. It is shown that, if mobility is unrestricted, only efficient conventions are stochastically stable. If there are barriers on mobility, the coexistence of different conventions can be observed. While imperfect observability and friction alone cannot prevent society from reaching an overall efficient outcome, restricted mobility can. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：93 / 111

页数：19

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