A state-contingent production approach to principal-agent problems with an application to point-source pollution control

被引:18
作者
Quiggin, J [1 ]
Chambers, RG
机构
[1] James Cook Univ N Queensland, Dept Econ, Townsville, Qld 4812, Australia
[2] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
关键词
moral hazard; state-contingent production; point-source pollution; principal-agent problem;
D O I
10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00044-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Two basic representations of principal-agent relationships, the 'state-space' and 'parameterized distribution' formulations, have emerged. Although the state-space formulation appears more natural, analytical studies using this formulation have had limited success. This paper develops a state-space formulation of the moral-hazard problem using a general representation of production under uncertainty. A closed-form solution for the agency-cost problem is derived. Comparative-static results are deduced. Next we solve the principal's problem of selecting the optimal output given the agency-cost function. The analysis is applied to the problem of point-source pollution control. (C) 1998 Published by Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:441 / 472
页数:32
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