Duopoly strategies programmed by experienced players

被引:92
作者
Selten, R
Mitzkewitz, M
Uhlich, GR
机构
[1] Universität Bonn, Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung I, D-53113 Bonn
关键词
duopoly; strategy method; computer tournament;
D O I
10.2307/2171752
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The strategy method asks experienced subjects to program strategies for a game. This paper reports on an application to a 20-period supergame of an asymmetric Cournot duopoly. The final strategies after three programming rounds show a typical structure. Typically, no expectations are formed and nothing is optimized. Instead of this, fairness criteria are used to determine cooperative goals, called ''ideal points.'' The subjects try to achieve cooperation by a ''measure-for-measure policy,'' which reciprocates movements towards and away from the ideal point by similar movements. A strategy tends to be more successful the more typical it is.
引用
收藏
页码:517 / 555
页数:39
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