Price and quality competition: The effect of differentiation and vertical integration

被引:72
作者
Matsubayashi, Nobuo [1 ]
机构
[1] Keio Univ, Fac Sci & Technol, Dept Adm Engn, Kohoku Ku, Yokohama, Kanagawa 2238522, Japan
关键词
economics; product differentiation; vertical integration; broadband internet market; non-cooperative game;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2006.04.028
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper studies an instance of price and quality competition between firms as seen in the recent Internet market. Consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level; therefore, two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits. Characterizing this competition from a microeconomic viewpoint, we consider two possible business strategies that firms can utilize to overcome the competition-the differentiation and the vertical integration with another complementary firm. We show an interesting result not seen in the well-known Bertrand price competition: not only does the differentiation always increase the firms' profits, but also it can increase the consumer's welfare in a quality-sensitive market. We further derive that under some mild conditions the monopolistic vertical integration that excludes the combination-purchase with a competitor's product is beneficial for both the integrated firm and its consumers. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:907 / 921
页数:15
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