Motivating Innovation

被引:1577
作者
Manso, Gustavo [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
INCENTIVE CONTRACTS; MORAL HAZARD; BANKRUPTCY; GROWTH; EXPLORATION; ECONOMICS; INVESTORS; MODEL; LAW;
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01688.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Motivating innovation is important in many incentive problems. This paper shows that the optimal innovation-motivating incentive scheme exhibits substantial tolerance (or even reward) for early failure and reward for long-term success. Moreover, commitment to a long-term compensation plan, job security, and timely feedback on performance are essential to motivate innovation. In the context of managerial compensation, the optimal innovation-motivating incentive scheme can be implemented via a combination of stock options with long vesting periods, option repricing, golden parachutes, and managerial entrenchment.
引用
收藏
页码:1823 / 1860
页数:38
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