CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking

被引：249

作者：

Kim, E. Han ^{[1
]}

Lu, Yao ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Michigan, Ross Sch Business, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

[2] Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 102卷 / 02期

关键词：

Managerial share ownership; R&D; Product market competition; Institutional ownership concentration; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; FIRM PERFORMANCE; FAMILY OWNERSHIP; STOCK OWNERSHIP; FOUNDER-CEOS; COMPENSATION; DETERMINANTS; INCENTIVES; INVESTMENT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.07.002

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper shows the relation between CEO ownership and firm valuation hinges critically on the strength of external governance (EG). The relation is hump-shaped when EG is weak, but is insignificant when EG is strong. The results imply that CEO ownership and EG are substitutes for mitigating agency problems when ownership is low. However, very high levels of share ownership can reduce firm value by entrenching the CEO and discouraging him from taking risk, unless mitigated by strong EG. We identify channels through which CEO ownership affects firm value by examining R&D, which is discretionary and risky. We find CEO ownership similarly exhibits a hump-shaped relation with R&D when EG is weak, but no relation when EG is strong. Our results are robust to endogeneity issues concerning CEO ownership and EG. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：272 / 292

页数：21

共 66 条

[1] Identifying the effect of managerial control on firm performance [J].

Adams, RB ;

Santos, JAC .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2006, 41 (1-2) :55-85

[2] Understanding the relationship between founder-CEOs and firm performance [J].

Adams, Renee ;

Almeida, Heitor ;

Ferreira, Daniel .

JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE, 2009, 16 (01) :136-150

[3] Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders [J].

Agrawal, A ;

Knoeber, CR .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1996, 31 (03) :377-397

[4] RISK REDUCTION AS A MANAGERIAL MOTIVE FOR CONGLOMERATE MERGERS [J].

AMIHUD, Y ;

LEV, B .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1981, 12 (02) :605-617

[5] Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 [J].

Anderson, RC ;

Reeb, DM .

JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2003, 58 (03) :1301-1328

[6]

Atanassov J, 2010, DO HOSTILE TAK UNPUB

[7] Labor and Corporate Governance: International Evidence from Restructuring Decisions [J].

Atanassov, Julian ;

Kim, E. Han .

JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2009, 64 (01) :341-374

[8]

Bebchuk L., 2004, Pay without Performance The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation

[9] What Matters in Corporate Governance? [J].

Bebchuk, Lucian ;

Cohen, Alma ;

Ferrell, Allen .

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2009, 22 (02) :783-827

[10] The CEO pay slice [J].

Bebchuk, Lucian A. ;

Cremers, K. J. Martijn ;

Peyer, Urs C. .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2011, 102 (01) :199-221

← 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 →