Can affirmative action be cost effective? An experimental examination of price-preference auctions

被引：42

作者：

Corns, A ^{[1
]}

Schotter, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10003 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1999年 / 89卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.89.1.291

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：291 / 305

页数：15

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