Limiting patentees' market power without reducing innovation incentives: The perverse benefits of uncertainty and non-injunctive remedies

被引：101

作者：

Ayres, I ^{[1
]}

Klemperer, P

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, Sch Law, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[2] Univ Oxford, Oxford OX1 2JD, England

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1290378

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：985 / 1033

页数：49

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