Limiting patentees' market power without reducing innovation incentives: The perverse benefits of uncertainty and non-injunctive remedies

[61] ON THE COMPLEX ECONOMICS OF PATENT SCOPE [J]. COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 1990, 90 (04) : 839 - 916

[62] Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual property rights and collective rights organizations [J]. CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 1996, 84 (05) : 1293 - 1393

[63] MERGES RP, 1997, INTELLECTUAL PROPERT, P306

[64] MERGES RP, 1990, COLUMBIA LAW REV, V90, P901

[65] LIMIT PRICING AND ENTRY UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION - AN EQUILIBRIUM-ANALYSIS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (02) : 443 - 459

[66] MORRISON WA, 1990, IND L REV, V23, P169

[67] MORRISON WA, 1990, IND L REV, V23, P196

[68] OMAN R, 1986, CARDOZO ARTS ENT LJ, V5, P37

[69] PATENTS AS OPTIONS - SOME ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE OF HOLDING EUROPEAN PATENT STOCKS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (04) : 755 - 784

[70] Pakes A., 1984, The rate of obsolescence of patents, research gestation lags, and the private rate of return to research resources, RD, Patents, and Productivity, P73

[61] ON THE COMPLEX ECONOMICS OF PATENT SCOPE [J]. COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 1990, 90 (04) : 839 - 916

[62] Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual property rights and collective rights organizations [J]. CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 1996, 84 (05) : 1293 - 1393

[63] MERGES RP, 1997, INTELLECTUAL PROPERT, P306

[64] MERGES RP, 1990, COLUMBIA LAW REV, V90, P901

[65] LIMIT PRICING AND ENTRY UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION - AN EQUILIBRIUM-ANALYSIS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (02) : 443 - 459

[66] MORRISON WA, 1990, IND L REV, V23, P169

[67] MORRISON WA, 1990, IND L REV, V23, P196

[68] OMAN R, 1986, CARDOZO ARTS ENT LJ, V5, P37

[69] PATENTS AS OPTIONS - SOME ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE OF HOLDING EUROPEAN PATENT STOCKS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (04) : 755 - 784

[70] Pakes A., 1984, The rate of obsolescence of patents, research gestation lags, and the private rate of return to research resources, RD, Patents, and Productivity, P73