Inherited control and firm performance

被引：601

作者：

Perez-Gonzalez, Francisco ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Columbia Univ, Grad Sch Business, New York, NY 10027 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2006年 / 96卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.96.5.1559

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

I use data from chief executive officer (CEO) successions to examine the impact of inherited control on firms' performance. I find that firms where incoming CEOs are related to the departing CEO, to a founder, or to a large shareholder by either blood or marriage underperform in terms of operating profitability and market-to-book ratios, relative to firms that promote unrelated CEOs. Consistent with wasteful nepotism, lower performance is prominent in firms that appoint family CEOs who did not attend "selective" undergraduate institutions. Overall, the evidence indicates that nepotism hurts performance by limiting the scope of labor market competition.

引用

页码：1559 / 1588

页数：30

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