Biology versus computation in the study of consciousness - Author's response

被引：14

作者：

Block, N

机构：

[1] Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York

来源：

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES | 1997年 / 20卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1017/S0140525X97330052

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

The distinction between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature.

引用

页码：159 / +

页数：1

共 29 条

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