Collateral, type of lender and relationship banking as determinants of credit risk

被引:167
作者
Jiménez, G [1 ]
Saurina, J [1 ]
机构
[1] Bank Spain, Directorate Gen Banking Regulat, C Alcala 50, Madrid 28014, Spain
关键词
credit risk; probability of default; collateral; relationship banking; credit register;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2003.09.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper analyses the determinants of the probability of default (PD) of bank loans. We focus the discussion on the role of a limited set of variables (collateral, type of lender and bank-borrower relationship) while controlling for the other explanatory variables. The study uses information on the more than three million loans entered into by Spanish credit institutions over a complete business cycle (1988-2000) collected by the Bank of Spain's Credit Register (Central de Informacion de Riesgos). We find that collateralised loans have a higher PD, loans granted by savings banks are riskier and, finally, that a close bank-borrower relationship increases the willingness to take more risk. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2191 / 2212
页数:22
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