Pay at the executive suite: How do US banks compensate their top management teams?

被引：31

作者：

Ang, J ^{[1
]}

Lauterbach, B

Schreiber, BZ

机构：

[1] Florida State Univ, Coll Business, Dept Finance, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA

[2] Bar Ilan Univ, Sch Business Adm, IL-52900 Ramat Gan, Israel

[3] Bank Israel, IL-91007 Jerusalem, Israel

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2002年 / 26卷 / 06期

关键词：

executive compensation; non-CEO top executives; pay performance relations;

D O I：

10.1016/S0378-4266(01)00165-0

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study examines how a large sample of US banks compensates their top management teams (i.e., the top four to five highest ranking executives in each bank). We observe two tiers of compensation in the executive suite: the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the rest of the top management team. CEOs receive not only greater pay in absolute dollar, but are also rewarded more in relation to performance, as manifested in having a larger portion of their pay in performance contingent compensation. Below the CEO, top executives have similar compensation structure and pay to performance elasticities. The results are robust to a significant size effect, and alternate measures of performance. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1143 / 1163

页数：21

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