Blood donation and the nature of altruism

被引:30
作者
Wildman, John [1 ]
Hollingsworth, Bruce [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Newcastle, Newcastle Upon Tyne NE1 7RU, Tyne & Wear, England
[2] Monash Univ, Clayton, Vic 3800, Australia
关键词
Blood donation; Charity; Public good; Altruism; Latent variable; PUBLIC-GOODS; IMPURE ALTRUISM; CHARITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.11.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Approximately 10% of people have O-negative blood. Because it can be transfused into almost anyone, hospitals particularly value such blood. We use this fact, together with the assumption that types are exogeneously assigned by nature, to design an empirical inquiry into altruism. We also investigate the timing of donations, especially focussing on the behaviour of new and established donors. We show that O-negative blood donors donate no more often than other people. Thus individuals apparently do not exhibit pure altruism. We speculate that instead blood donors may be driven by a broad notion of duty rather than by a far-sighted, rational unselfishness. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:492 / 503
页数:12
相关论文
共 30 条
[11]   GIFT OR GOOD - A CONTEMPORARY EXAMINATION OF THE VOLUNTARY AND COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF BLOOD DONATION [J].
BEAL, RW ;
VANAKEN, WG .
VOX SANGUINIS, 1992, 63 (01) :1-5
[12]   Incentives and prosocial behavior [J].
Benabou, Roland ;
Tirole, Jean .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2006, 96 (05) :1652-1678
[13]   ON THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC-GOODS [J].
BERGSTROM, T ;
BLUME, L ;
VARIAN, H .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1986, 29 (01) :25-49
[14]  
Cooper M.H., 1968, PRICE BLOOD EC STUDY
[15]   ALTRUISM AND THE ARGUMENT FROM OFFSETTING TRANSFERS [J].
COWEN, T .
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY, 1993, 10 (01) :225-245
[16]   EQUITY AND EQUALITY IN HEALTH AND HEALTH-CARE [J].
CULYER, AJ ;
WAGSTAFF, A .
JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 1993, 12 (04) :431-457
[17]   Infectious and immunologic consequences of blood transfusion [J].
Dellinger, EP ;
Anaya, DA .
CRITICAL CARE, 2004, 8 (Suppl 2) :S18-S23
[18]   Working and shirking: Equilibrium in public-goods games with overlapping generations of players [J].
Dickson, ES ;
Shepsle, KA .
JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 2001, 17 (02) :285-318
[19]   Motivation crowding theory [J].
Frey, BS ;
Jegen, R .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, 2001, 15 (05) :589-611
[20]   Autologous donation error rates in Canada [J].
Goldman, M ;
RemyPrince, S ;
Trepanier, A ;
Decary, F .
TRANSFUSION, 1997, 37 (05) :523-527