Supply chain coordination and decision making under consignment contract with revenue sharing

被引:143
作者
Li, Sijie [1 ]
Zhu, Zhanbei [2 ]
Huang, Lihua [3 ]
机构
[1] Southeast Univ, Inst Syst Engn, Nanjing 211189, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Management, Shanghai 200052, Peoples R China
[3] Fudan Univ, Sch Management, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
基金
中国博士后科学基金;
关键词
Supply chain management; Consignment contract with revenue sharing; Coordination; Cooperative game; DEMAND UNCERTAINTY; POWER; INVENTORY; MODEL; PERFORMANCE; DOMINANCE; FRAMEWORK; CHANNEL; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijpe.2008.07.015
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
Consignment contract with revenue sharing has been widely applied in many industries and is especially popular in on-line marketplaces. In this paper we consider a supply chain with an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer where a single-period product is produced and sold. The manufacturer chooses the delivery quantity and the retail price, and the retailer sets the revenue shares. Utilizing Nash bargaining model, a cooperative game model is developed to implement profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer to achieve their cooperation. When the manufacturer and the retailer are assumed to be risk-neutral, under a very mild restriction on the demand distribution, the decentralized supply chain can be perfectly coordinated and both the manufacturer and the retailer can earn more in cooperation. In this paper, we also analyze how the supply chain system parameters impact the optimal supply chain decisions and the supply chain performance. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:88 / 99
页数:12
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