Collective decisions with interdependent valuations

被引:17
作者
Grüner, HP
Kiel, A
机构
[1] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany
[2] IZA, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
[3] CEPR, London EC1V 7RR, England
关键词
collective decisions; asymmetric information; interdependent valuations;
D O I
10.1016/s0014-2921(02)00321-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 [经济学];
摘要
Many collective decision problems have in common that individuals' desired outcomes are correlated but not identical. This paper studies collective decisions with private information about desired policies. Each agent holds private information which mainly concerns his own bliss point, but private information also affects all other agents. We concentrate on two specific mechanisms, the median and mean mechanism, establish the existence of symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria of the corresponding games and compare the performance of the mechanisms for different degrees of interdependencies. Applications of our framework include the provision of public goods and the design of decision processes in international organizations. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1147 / 1168
页数:22
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