Contagion and coordination in random networks

被引:62
作者
Lopez-Pintado, Dunia [1 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, ISERP, New York, NY 10027 USA
关键词
contagion; coordination games; scale-free networks; mean-field theory;
D O I
10.1007/s00182-006-0026-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the problem of spreading a particular behavior among agents located in a random social network. In each period of time, neighboring agents interact strategically playing a 2 x 2 coordination game. Assuming myopic best-response dynamics, we show that there exists a threshold for the degree of risk dominance of an action such that below that threshold, contagion of the action occurs. This threshold depends on the connectivity distribution of the network. Based on this, we show that the well-known scale-free networks do not always properly support this type of contagion, which is better accomplished by more intermediate variance networks.
引用
收藏
页码:371 / 381
页数:11
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