Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games

被引:151
作者
Benaïm, M
Weibull, JW
机构
[1] Univ Cergy Pontoise, Dept Math, F-95302 Cergy Pontoise, France
[2] Boston Univ, Dept Econ, Boston, MA 02215 USA
关键词
game theory; evolution; approximation; large deviations; Markov chains;
D O I
10.1111/1468-0262.00429
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper provides deterministic approximation results for stochastic processes that arise when finite populations recurrently play finite games. The processes are Markov chains, and the approximation is defined in continuous time as a system of ordinary differential equations of the type studied in evolutionary game theory. We establish precise connections between the long-run behavior of the discrete stochastic process, for large populations, and its deterministic flow approximation. In particular, we provide probabilistic bounds on exit times from and visitation rates to neighborhoods of attractors; to the deterministic flow. We sharpen these results in the special case of ergodic processes.
引用
收藏
页码:873 / 903
页数:31
相关论文
共 24 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], SEM PROB STRASB
[2]   Recursive algorithms, urn processes and chaining number of chain recurrent sets [J].
Benaim, M .
ERGODIC THEORY AND DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS, 1998, 18 :53-87
[3]  
Benaïm M, 1999, ANN APPL PROBAB, V9, P216
[4]   Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games [J].
Benaïm, M ;
Hirsch, MW .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1999, 29 (1-2) :36-72
[5]   Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection [J].
Binmore, K ;
Samuelson, L .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1997, 74 (02) :235-265
[6]   MUSICAL CHAIRS - MODELING NOISY EVOLUTION [J].
BINMORE, KG ;
SAMUELSON, L ;
VAUGHAN, R .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1995, 11 (01) :1-35
[7]  
Bomze I. M., 1986, International Journal of Game Theory, V15, P31, DOI 10.1007/BF01769275
[8]   Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics [J].
Borgers, T ;
Sarin, R .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1997, 77 (01) :1-14
[9]   CONTINUOUS APPROXIMATION OF DYNAMICAL-SYSTEMS WITH RANDOMLY MATCHED INDIVIDUALS [J].
BOYLAN, RT .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1995, 66 (02) :615-625
[10]   LEARNING, LOCAL INTERACTION, AND COORDINATION [J].
ELLISON, G .
ECONOMETRICA, 1993, 61 (05) :1047-1071