Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

被引:82
作者
Bulow, Jeremy [1 ]
Klemperer, Paul [2 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Univ Oxford Nuffield Coll, Oxford OX1 1NF, England
关键词
SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM; WINNERS CURSE; ENTRY; SEARCH; INFORMATION; MECHANISMS; STRATEGIES; TAKEOVERS; BIDDERS; DESIGN;
D O I
10.1257/aer.99.4.1544
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But preemptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry-precisely because of its inefficiency-it usually generates higher expected revenue. We also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc. (JEL D44, G34, L13)
引用
收藏
页码:1544 / 1575
页数:32
相关论文
共 68 条
[1]  
AKTAS N, 2007, 1907 UCLA AND SCH MA
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1991, Game Theory
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2004, Auctions: Theory and Practice (The Toulouse Lectures in Economics)
[4]   SELECTING A SELLING INSTITUTION - AUCTIONS VERSUS SEQUENTIAL SEARCH [J].
ARNOLD, MA ;
LIPPMAN, SA .
ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1995, 33 (01) :1-23
[6]   Stock Repurchase as a Takeover Defense [J].
Bagnoli, Mark ;
Gordon, Roger ;
Lipman, Barton L. .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 1989, 2 (03) :423-443
[7]  
BERNHARDT D, 1993, AM ECON REV, V83, P771
[8]   Do auctions induce a winner's curse? New evidence from the corporate takeover market [J].
Boone, Audra L. ;
Mulherin, J. Harold .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2008, 89 (01) :1-19
[9]   Do termination provisions truncate the takeover bidding process? [J].
Boone, Audra L. ;
Mulherin, J. Harold .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2007, 20 (02) :461-489
[10]   How are firms sold? [J].
Boone, Audra L. ;
Mulherin, J. Harold .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2007, 62 (02) :847-875