Fictitious play for finding system optimal routings in dynamic traffic networks

被引：39

作者：

Garcia, A ^{[1
]}

Reaume, D ^{[1
]}

Smith, RL ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Michigan, Dept Ind & Operat Engn, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

来源：

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL | 2000年 / 34卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/S0191-2615(99)00018-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We introduce a novel procedure to compute system optimal routings in a dynamic traffic network. Fictitious play is utilized within a game of identical interests wherein vehicles are treated as players with the common payoff of average trip time experienced in the network. This decentralized approach via repeated play of the fictitious game is proven to converge to a local system optimal routing. Results from a large-scale computational test on a real network are presented. (C) 2000 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：147 / 156

页数：10

共 12 条

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