Repetition and reputation: Implications for trust and trustworthiness when institutions change

被引：118

作者：

Bohnet, I

Huck, S

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Kennedy Sch Govt, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

[2] UCL, Dept Econ, London WC1E 6BT, England

[3] UCL, ELSE, London WC1E 6BT, England

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/0002828041301506

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：362 / 366

页数：5

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