Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?

被引：22

作者：

Shachat, J ^{[1
]}

Swarthout, JT

机构：

[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Singapore 117548, Singapore

[2] Univ Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA

来源：

MATHEMATICAL METHODS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 2004年 / 59卷 / 03期

关键词：

Nash Equilibrium; Nash; Variable Model; Mixed Strategy; Belief Formation;

D O I：

10.1007/s001860400354

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting deviations from Nash equilibrium. However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior and performance. We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation which rationalizes observed heterogeneity and other features of the data.

引用

页码：359 / 373

页数：15