Evolution and game theory

被引：111

作者：

Samuelson, L ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES | 2002年 / 16卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/0895330027256

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Research in noncooperative game theory has focused attention on two questions: Should we expect equilibrium play? If so, which of the multiple equilibria that arise in many games should we expect? This paper summarizes recent approaches to these questions that have been based on evolutionary models.

引用

页码：47 / 66

页数：20

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