The Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarism

被引：19

作者：

Albert, Richard ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Boston Coll, Sch Law, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167 USA

来源：

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW | 2009年 / 57卷 / 03期

关键词：

HIGH CRIMES; NO CONFIDENCE; SEPARATION; POWERS; GOVERNMENT; IMPEACHMENT; DEMOCRACY; CONSTITUTION; MISDEMEANORS; PROPOSAL;

D O I：

10.5131/ajcl.2008.0016

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

No question of constitutional design is more intensely debated than whether emerging democracies should adopt presidential or parliamentary systems. This is an important debate but it misses a critical point about constitutional design-namely that the structural differences between presidentialism and parliamentarism conceal much more than they reveal. In this Article, I demonstrate precisely how conventional accounts of the structural differences between presidentialism and parliamentarism actually obscure their functional similarities.

引用

页码：531 / 577

页数：47