Family control, board independence and earnings management: Evidence based on Hong Kong firms

被引:274
作者
Jaggi, Bikki [1 ,2 ]
Leung, Sidney [3 ]
Gul, Ferdinand [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Rutgers State Univ, Sch Business, Dept Accounting & Informat Syst, Piscataway, NJ 08854 USA
[2] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Accountancy, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[4] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[5] Univ Malaya, Fac Business & Accountancy, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
关键词
Corporate governance; Earnings management; Earnings quality; Family ownership concentration; Family board members; ACCOUNTING EARNINGS; INVESTOR PROTECTION; OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE; DIRECTORS; ACCRUALS; INCENTIVES; SEPARATION; QUALITY; COSTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2009.06.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In this study, we document that independent corporate boards of Hong Kong firms provide effective monitoring of earnings management, which suggests that despite differences in institutional environments. corporate board independence is important to ensure high-quality financial reporting. The findings also show that the monitoring effectiveness of corporate boards is moderated in family-controlled firms, either through ownership concentration or the presence of family members on corporate boards. The results based on firms reporting small earnings increases provide additional support for our finding that the monitoring effectiveness of independent corporate boards is moderated in family-controlled firms. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:281 / 300
页数:20
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