Profit-sharing versus fixed-payment contracts: Evidence from the motion pictures industry

被引：58

作者：

Chisholm, DC ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] MIT,DEPT ECON,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139

来源：

JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION | 1997年 / 13卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023378

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The choice between sharing and fixed-payment compensation schemes is examined using data on contracts from the motion pictures industry. Several competing explanations are explored, including moral hazard mitigation, risk sharing, liquidity constraints, and the superstar phenomenon. Detailed descriptive statistics are presented, and qualitative variation in contracting clauses is analyzed within this industry's institutional setting.

引用

页码：169 / 201

页数：33

共 56 条

[1]

ALCHIAN AA, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P777

[2] CONTRACT CHOICE IN MODERN AGRICULTURE - CASH RENT VERSUS CROPSHARE [J].

ALLEN, D ;

LUECK, D .

JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1992, 35 (02) :397-426

[3] TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE DESIGN OF CROPSHARE CONTRACTS [J].

ALLEN, DW ;

LUECK, D .

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1993, 24 (01) :78-100

[4]

ALPERT H, 1969, FILM 68 69 ANTHOLOGY

[5]

ALVAREZ M, 1982, M ALVAREZS INDEX MOT

[6]

[Anonymous], VARIETY

[7]

[Anonymous], 1972, DICT FILM MAKERS

[8]

[Anonymous], 1997, EC ANAL PROPERTY RIG, DOI DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511609398

[9]

*ART MURPH BOX REG, ART MURPH BOX REG

[10]

BEIL N, 1980, ACTORS MANUAL

← 1 2 3 4 5 6 →