The security implications of VeriChip cloning

被引:35
作者
Halamka, John
Juels, Ari
Stubblefield, Adam
Westhues, Jonathan
机构
[1] Beth Israel Deaconess Med Ctr, Boston, MA 02215 USA
[2] RSA Labs, Bedford, MA USA
[3] Johns Hopkins Univ, Baltimore, MD USA
关键词
D O I
10.1197/jamia.M2143
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The VeriChip (TM) is a Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tag produced commercially for implantation in human beings. Its proposed uses include identification of medical patients, physical access control, contactless retail payment, and even the tracing of kidnapping victims. As the authors explain, the VeriChip is vulnerable to simple, over-the-air spoofing attacks. In particular, an attacker capable of scanning a VeriChip, eavesdropping on its signal, or simply learning its serial number can create a spoof device whose radio appearance is indistinguishable from the original. We explore the practical implications of this security vulnerability. The authors argue that: 1. The VeriChip should serve exclusively for identification, and not authentication or access control. 2. Paradoxically, for bearer safety, a VeriChip should be easy to spoof; an attacker then has less incentive to coerce victims or extract VeriChips from victims' bodies.
引用
收藏
页码:601 / 607
页数:7
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