Issue-by-issue negotiations: The role of information and time preference

被引：46

作者：

Bac, M ^{[1
]}

Raff, H ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] INDIANA UNIV,DEPT ECON,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47405

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1996年 / 13卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1996.0028

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The alternating offers bargaining game with two pies and incomplete information has a bargaining sequential equilibrium where the ''strong'' type of the informed player restricts his offer to one pie, leaving it to the other player to make an offer on the second pie. An offer on both pies comes only from the ''weak'' type of informed player. Hence, an issue-by-issue negotiation agenda may arise from signaling considerations. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：125 / 134

页数：10

共 12 条

[1] STRATEGIC DELAY IN BARGAINING [J].