Non-excludable public good experiments

被引：22

作者：

Cason, TN

Saijo, T ^{[1
]}

Yamato, T

Yokotani, K

机构：

[1] Osaka Univ, Inst Social & Econ Res, Ibaraki, Osaka 5670047, Japan

[2] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, Dept Econ, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA

[3] Res Inst Econ Trade & Ind, Tokyo 1008901, Japan

[4] Tokyo Inst Technol, Grad Sch Decis Sci & Technol, Dept Value & Decis Sci, Tokyo 1528552, Japan

[5] Govt Housing Loan Corp, Res & Survey Dept, Tokyo 1128570, Japan

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2004年 / 49卷 / 01期

关键词：

laboratory; fairness; spite; social preferences; voluntary contribution mechanism; Hawk-Dove game;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We conduct a two-stage game experiment with a non-excludable public good. In the first stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to contributing nothing to provide a pure public good. In the second stage, knowing the other subject's commitment decision, subjects who did not commit in the first stage choose contributions to the public good. We found no support for the evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, and the ratio of subjects who did not commit to contributing nothing increased as periods advanced; that is, the free-riding rate declined over time. Furthermore, this behavior did not arise due to altruism or kindness among subjects, but from spiteful behavior of subjects. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：81 / 102

页数：22

共 36 条

[11] Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem? [J].