A public choice perspective of IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality

被引：43

作者：

Dreher, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Exeter, Sch Business & Econ, Exeter EX4 4PU, Devon, England

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 2004年 / 119卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

Panel Data; Public Finance; Public Choice; Bargaining Power; Choice Theory;

D O I：

10.1023/B:PUCH.0000033326.19804.52

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper explains IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality stressing changes in relative bargaining power of different stakeholders over time. It applies public choice theory to explain the interests of the institutions' member states, its borrowers and staffs as well as private actors attaching their money to the IFIs' programs. Using panel data for 43 countries between 1987-99 it is shown that the number of Fund conditions seems to be influenced by contemporaneous World Bank activity and "bad" policies.

引用

页码：445 / 464

页数：20

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