Games and structures

被引：18

作者：

Willer, D

Skvoretz, J

机构：

[1] Department of Sociology, Laboratory for Sociological Research, University of South Carolina

[2] Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina

[3] Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina, Columbia

来源：

RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY | 1997年 / 9卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

games theory; exchange theory; structure; power;

D O I：

10.1177/104346397009001001

中图分类号：

C91 [社会学];

学科分类号：

030301 ; 1204 ;

摘要：

Frequently applications of game theory assume, but do not show, that games are contained in social structures. The new analysis offered here uncovers games embedded in structures by attributing strategies to some positions and deriving the pay-off matrices for others. As structures vary so do the games embedded in them. All strong power structures contain prisoners' dilemma games for at least some range of pay-offs while some contain a chain of prisoners' dilemma games linked by defections. As a result, the development of interpersonal power in strong power structures is produced by free-riding of those low in power. Examples of other types of structures are given and other games are found that do not contain defection chains. Issues of dynamics including rates of change of power and coalition formation as a condition of countervailing power are addressed. New experiments offer support for central formulations.

引用

页码：5 / 35

页数：31

共 42 条

[11] POWER IN EXCHANGE NETWORKS - A POWER-DEPENDENCE FORMULATION [J].