License to be more innovative

被引：10

作者：

Lin, P

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas

来源：

REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1997年 / 12卷 / 02期

关键词：

licensing; R&D race;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1007710417985

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A patent holder may choose to give up its current leading position through patent licensing in order to increase its incentive to innovate further and thus avoid falling behind its rivals in future R&D races. We show that because of this ''catching-up'' effect, licensing may occur even when it reduces current industry profits. The overall effect of licensing is to slow down the pace of innovation, as it reduces the licensee's incentive to conduct R&D.

引用

页码：271 / 278

页数：8