A theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms

被引:192
作者
Gibbons, R
Waldman, M
机构
[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1162/003355399556287
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We show that a framework that integrates job assignment, human-capital acquisition, and learning captures several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms, including the following. First, real-wage decreases are not rare but demotions are. Second, wage increases are serially correlated. Third, promotions are associated with large wage increases. Fourth, wage increases at promotion are small relative to the difference between average wages across levels of the job ladder. Fifth, workers who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted quickly to the next.
引用
收藏
页码:1321 / 1358
页数:38
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