Matching and anonymity

被引：23

作者：

Aliprantis, Charalambos D.

Camera, Gabriele ^{[1
]}

Puzzello, Daniela

机构：

[1] Purdue Univ, Dept Econ, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA

[2] Univ Kentucky, Dept Econ, Lexington, KY 40506 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2006年 / 29卷 / 02期

关键词：

bilateral matching; frictions; anonymous trading; spatial interactions;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-005-0024-z

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This work introduces a set-theoretic foundation of deterministic bilateral matching processes and studies their properties. In particular, it formalizes a link between matching and informational constraints by developing a notion of anonymity that is based on the agents' matching histories. It also explains why and how various matching processes generate different degrees of "informational isolation" in the economy. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach to modeling matching frameworks by discussing the classical turnpike model of Townsend.

引用

页码：415 / 432

页数：18

共 26 条

[1]

Aliprantis C., 1999, Infinite-dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide, DOI DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-03961-8

[2]

ALIPRANTIS CD, 2004, 116 PURD U

[3] Dynamical systems with a continuum of randomly matched agents [J].