Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem

被引：144

作者：

Ertan, Arhan ^{[2
]}

Page, Talbot ^{[3
]}

Putterman, Louis ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Brown Univ, Dept Econ, Providence, RI 02912 USA

[2] Tufts Univ, Medford, MA 02155 USA

[3] Brown Univ, Providence, RI 02912 USA

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2009年 / 53卷 / 05期

关键词：

Public goods; Collective action; Punishment; Voting; Institutions; PUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTS; RECIPROCITY; COOPERATION; ECONOMICS; MECHANISM;

D O I：

10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.09.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study a voluntary contributions mechanism in which punishment may be allowed, depending on subjects' voted rules. We found that out of 160 group votes, even when groups had no prior experience with unrestricted punishment, no group ever voted to allow unrestricted punishment and no group ever allowed punishment of high contributors. Over a series of votes and periods of learning we found a distinct reluctance to allow any punishment at the beginning, with a gradual but clear evolution toward allowing punishment of low contributors. And groups allowing punishment of only low contributors achieved levels of cooperation and efficiency that are among the highest in the literature on social dilemmas. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：495 / 511

页数：17

共 38 条

[1] Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism [J].