Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation?

被引:54
作者
Beetsma, RMWJ
Bovenberg, AL
机构
[1] Univ Amsterdam, Dept Econ, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] Tilburg Univ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[3] CEPR, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
关键词
common central bank; monetary union; credibility effect; government myopia; price-stability weight; (optimal) debt target; supply shocks;
D O I
10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00035-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
If discretionary monetary policy gives rise to an inflation bias, monetary unification boosts the accumulation of public debt. The additional debt accumulation harms welfare if governments are sufficiently myopic. In the presence of myopic governments, debt ceilings play a useful role in avoiding excessive debt accumulation in a monetary union and allowing a conservative, independent central bank to focus on price stability. With supply shocks, monetary unification results in excessive variability of public debt. A debt target that constrains stabilization policy helps to prevent this. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:299 / 325
页数:27
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