Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution

被引：50

作者：

Willinger, M ^{[1
]}

Ziegelmeyer, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Strasbourg 1, Inst Univ France, BETA Theme, F-67085 Strasbourg, France

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1999年 / 65卷 / 03期

关键词：

experimental economics; public goods;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00177-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that experimental subjects contribute more to the public good if they perceive the actions of others as a positive externality rather than a negative externality. In our experiment, partial contribution is the single-shot dominant strategy. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：323 / 328

页数：6