The absent-minded centipede

被引：7

作者：

Dulleck, U ^{[1
]}

Oechssler, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HUMBOLDT UNIV BERLIN,DEPT ECON,D-1086 BERLIN,GERMANY

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1997年 / 55卷 / 03期

关键词：

imperfect recall; absent-mindedness; centipede game; bounded rationality;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00090-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this note we apply the notion of absent-mindedness (see Piccione and Rubinstein, 1994), which is a form of imperfect recall, to the Rosenthal (1981) centipede game. We show that for standard versions of the centipede game a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which play is continued almost to the end if one player is known to be absent-minded. In fact, it is sufficient that one player is known to be absent-minded with sufficiently high probability. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.

引用

页码：309 / 315

页数：7

共 7 条

[1]

AUMANN RJ, 1996, 94 HEBR U JER

[2]

Kreps D. M, 1990, COURSE MICROECONOMIC

[3] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J].