CEO tenure, the risk of termination and firm value

被引：62

作者：

Brookman, Jeff ^{[1
]}

Thistle, Paul D. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Idaho State Univ, Dept Finance, Pocatello, ID 83209 USA

[2] Univ Nevada, Dept Finance, Las Vegas, NV 89154 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2009年 / 15卷 / 03期

关键词：

CEO termination; Corporate governance; CEO tenure; CEO turnover; Survival analysis; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; CORPORATE-FINANCE; AGENCY COSTS; COMPENSATION; PERFORMANCE; DETERMINANTS; TURNOVER; ENTRENCHMENT; GOVERNANCE; DIRECTORS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.01.002

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine CEOs' risk of termination, its determinants and its effect on firm value. Using survival analysis, we find that the risk of termination increases for about thirteen years before decreasing slightly with CEO tenure: 82% of CEOs have tenure of less than thirteen years. We also find that tenure increases with performance and compensation and decreases with monitoring by the board. Changes in the risk of termination do not have a significant effect on firm value. Taken as a whole, our results are consistent with the view that corporate governance functions reasonably well for the vast majority of firms. (c) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：331 / 344

页数：14

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