Organizational complexity and CEO labor markets: Evidence from diversified firms

被引：61

作者：

Berry, Tannny K.

Bizjak, John M.

Lemmon, Michael L.

Naveen, Lalitha

机构：

[1] Portland State Univ, Dept Finance, Portland, OR 97207 USA

[2] Berry Consultants, College Stn, TX USA

[3] Univ Utah, Dept Finance, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA

[4] Georgia State Univ, Dept Finance, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2006年 / 12卷 / 04期

关键词：

managerial labor market; CEO turnover; diversification; corporate governance;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.04.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine whether CEO turnover and succession patterns vary with firm complexity. Specifically, we compare CEO turnover in diversified versus focused firms. We find that CEO turnover in diversified firms is completely insensitive to both accounting and stock-price performance, but CEO turnover in focused firms is sensitive to firm performance. Diversified firms also experience less forced turnover than focused firms. Following turnover, replacement CEOs in diversified firms are older, more educated, and are paid more when hired. Collectively, our results indicate that the labor market for CEOs is different across diversified and focused firms and that firm complexity and scope affect CEO succession. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：797 / 817

页数：21

共 35 条

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